Euthanasia remains controversial in Canada and an issue of debate among physicians. Most studies have explored the opinion of health professionals regarding its legalization, but have not investigated their intentions when faced with performing euthanasia. These studies are also considered atheoretical. The purposes of the present study were to fill this gap in the literature by identifying the psychosocial determinants of physicians’ intention to practice euthanasia in palliative care and verifying whether respecting the patient’s autonomy is important for physicians.

The Logic of Port-Royal, first published in 1662 by the Jansenists Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, is a work that underlines the inadequacies of the traditional logic. Traditional logic, which included the texts of Aristotle's Organon and the works of the scholastics, was experiencing a mild renaissance in the seventeenth century following its outright and brutal discrediting by the humanists of the previous two centuries. Arnauld and Nicole introduce a fairly original system of logic that attempts to remedy the shortcomings (...) of the revived tradition; they dismiss the Aristotelian "Categories", "Predicables", and "Topics", ignore the scholastic "Doctrine of Terms and Consequence", and suggest a single "General Principle" by means of which the validity of all arguments can be decided. The Principle is based on a notion of containment, divided into entendue and comprehension , which applies to all terms. Because the notion of containment is linked to the objective reality of Cartesian ideas, the authors can claim that their system of logic properly describes reality. The General Principle also suggests that terminist logic is logically and epistemologically prior to sentential logic because, Arnauld and Nicole claim, it governs the Dictum de Omni et Nullo and the Nota Notae. The self-evidence of the two dicta confirmed the validity of all syllogisms of the first figure; furthermore, all syllogisms of other figures could be reduced to one of the first figure. With the General Principle, however, there is no need for such reduction to the first figure. This additional result makes the theorem of sentential logic, "$\supset$r)$\approx$$\supset$-q)", which was needed for the reductions of Baroco and Bocardo, unnecessary. The fact that no theorem of sentential logic is needed to underline term logic guarantees the autonomy of the latter. (shrink)

Gaston Bachelard began his academic career as a teacher of physics and chemistry, turning eventually to the history and philosophy of science: a personal evolution not uncommon in France, which since the turn of the century has also offered the examples of Duhem, Poincaré and Meyerson. Unlike these older contemporaries, however, Bachelard took as his special province not the logical structure of scientific theory, or the norms of theory construction, but the inventive spontaneity or “dynamism” of scientific thought. While (...) celebrating science as the ultimate expression of reason, he paid as much attention to its imaginative false starts as to the rational explanations it adopts. By 1938, moreover, he had turned explicitly to the activity of imagination: this became the general theme of a number of works that revolve freely about the four elements of an earlier and more poetic “science,” and the philosopher's field eventually was to become nothing less than his total experience, whether reasoned, lived or dreamed. (shrink)

This guide accompanies the following articles: Sonia Roca‐Royes, ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00363.x. Sonia Roca‐Royes, ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00364.x. Author’s Introduction Intuitively, George Clooney could lose a finger and he would still be him. Also intuitively, he could not lose his humanity without ceasing to be altogether. So while he could have one less finger, he could not be other than human. These intuitions suggest that (...) there are two kinds of properties: on the one hand, there are essential properties and, on the other, there are accidental properties. Essentialism is the view that captures those intuitions and claims that some of an object’s properties are essential and some are accidental. Essential properties are often appealed to in metaphysical arguments. Consider the famous Goliath–Lumpl example. Goliath is a clay‐statue, and Lumpl is the piece of clay from which Goliath is made. Are Goliath and Lumpl the same entity, or are they distinct, despite coinciding in the same spatial region (at least for a period of time)? An argument in favour of their distinctness appeals to essential properties. Let s be Goliath’s shape. Lumpl’s current shape is therefore also s. It seems that Lumpl could lose its current shape and still exist. Yet, if Goliath – the statue – were melted, for instance, it would cease to exist. Behind this reasoning is the belief that having shape s is essential to Goliath but not to Lumpl. Goliath and Lumpl can therefore be distinguished by their essential properties. Consequently, and by Leibniz’s Indiscernibility of Identicals– according to which identicals cannot be distinguished – Goliath and Lumpl are distinct objects. The essentialist intuition appealed to in this argument is that shapes are essential to statues but not to pieces of clay. Of course, this particular argument – like any other – can be resisted. It is all the same a good illustration of how essentialism is put to work in metaphysics. A good understanding of the broad phenomenon of essentialism is therefore an unavoidable task, since the credit of a lot of metaphysical arguments partially depends on it. Although the topic has been studied for millenniums, the two papers that this guide accompanies are focused on contemporary issues in essentialism, and so will do this guide too. Author Recommends Fine, Kit. ‘Essence and Modality.’Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16. One of the most cited and influential papers against the modal account of the notion of essence and in favour of what has subsequently been referred to in the literature as ‘the Finean account of the notion of essence’. Forbes, Graeme. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. A foundational work in modality and essentialism. The first two chapters provide a valuable introduction to propositional and first order modal logic. Chapters 5–8 constitute a comprehensive essentialist theory and contain some of the most cited arguments for individual essences. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Another foundational work. With this book – which is, among other things, a defence of a Direct Theory of Reference – Kripke rescues, after Quine’s powerful attacks against it, and using the semantic rigidity of proper names, (Aristotelian) essentialism. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. An extremely valuable recent contribution to the field. Here, Mackie defends that, although essentialism is a real phenomenon, there are much fewer essential properties than is standardly believed, and labels this view ‘Minimalist Essentialism’. Beyond the intrinsic interest of the defence of Minimalist Essentialism, the book is also highly recommended for its clear reconstructions – and discussions – of some of the most influential essentialist arguments. In addition, the book’s bibliography is very comprehensive and updated, and it might be a useful resource for students. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: OUP, 1974. Yet another foundational work. Here, Plantinga offers his essentialist theory which, like Forbes’, also incorporates individual essences although of a very different sort from Forbes’. Plantinga believes in purely non‐qualitative individual essences, whereas Forbes’ aims at purely qualitative ones. The book is also excellent to provide a solid background to those unfamiliar with the topic. Roca‐Royes. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011): 54–64, doi: 10.1111/j.1747‐9991.2010.00363.x. This is one of the two papers this guide accompanies. It contains a comparative examination of two opposed responses to the problem of possibilia. One solution crucially appeals to individual essences and another – compatible with them, but not dependent on them – makes existence a necessary‐whenever‐possible property. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Against what Kripke’s Naming and Necessity might have induced us to believe, Salmon’s Reference and Essence argues that essentialism cannot be derived from the Direct Theory of Reference. Our commitments to essentialism should therefore come from somewhere else. It also contains one of the most cited and influential arguments against the transitivity of the accessibility relation between worlds, which relies on flexible essential properties. Online Materials The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy publishes extremely valuable entries on a vast variety of topics which are conveniently updated and revised. On essentialism, the following are to be highlighted: Teresa Robertson, ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties’: Takashi Yagisawa, ‘Possible Objects’: Penelope Mackie, ‘Transworld Identity’: PhilPapers is an interactive directory of online philosophical publications to which one can subscribe, and which allows authors to submit their latest work. One might find it useful to check this on a regular basis, since contents are constantly updated. The following link is to the site’s resources on essentialism:. Sample Syllabus Because the phenomenon of essentialism is very broad, one can design an entire course on it, thereby having enough time to see some of the issues in considerable depth. The sample syllabus suggested here is of one such course, focusing exclusively on contemporary issues in essentialism. Less deeply, the topic of essentialism can also be introduced in a general course on metaphysics or on modality. To this effect, focusing on some of the topics suggested in weeks 1–6 below would perhaps be more appropriate than focusing on the more complex issues suggested for weeks 7–10. Week 1. Introduction to Essentialism. Two Notions of Essential Property: The Modal Account and the Finean Account Fine, Kit. ‘Essence and Modality.’Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16. Robertson, Teresa. ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties.’Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 1–2. Week 2. Essentialist Principles, I: Three Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III. Mackie, Penelope. ‘Identity, Time and Necessity.’Proceedings for the Aristotelian Society 98 (1998): 59–78. Rohbraugh, Guy and deRosset, Louis. ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin.’Mind 133 (2004): 705–25. Week 3. Essentialist Principles, II: Essentiality of Kind Brody, Baruch. ‘Natural Kinds and Real Essences.’Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 431–46. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapters 7 and 8. Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Chapter 3. Week 4. Essentialist Principles, III: Natural Kind Essentialism Kripke, Saul. ‘Identity and Necessity.’Identity and Individuation, Ed. M. K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press, 1971. 135–64. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III. Putnam, Hilary. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”.’Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 215–71. Week 5. Sufficient‐for‐Existence Properties (and Cross‐World Identification Principles) Chisholm, Roderick. ‘Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions.’Noûs 1.1 (1967): 1–8. Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapter 3. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Chapter 7. Week 6. Individual Essences Mackie, Penelope. ‘Transworld Identity.’The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Section 4. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 3–4. Week 7. Flexible Essential Properties and S4 Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 3. Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Appendix 1. Week 8. Individual Essences and Possibilia Peacocke, Christopher. ‘Principles for Possibilia.’Noûs 36.3 (2002): 486–508. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 2. Week 9. Necessitism and Essentialism: A Third Notion of Essential Property Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. ‘In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete.’Philosophical Studies 84 (1996): 283–94. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 5. Williamson, Timothy. ‘Bare Possibilia.’Erkenntnis 48 (1998): 257–73. Week 10. Essentialism and Modal Logic: The Barcan Formula Menzel, Christopher. ‘Actualism.’The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL:. Section 2. Roca‐Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis‐à‐vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54–64. Section 4. Focus Questions • There is a debate as to whether essential properties– as well as individual essences and sufficient‐for‐existence properties– should be specified in purely qualitative terms or whether, by contrast, non‐purely qualitative – or even purely non‐qualitative – specifications are allowed. What are the main arguments against the availability of purely qualitative specifications? • Flexible essential properties seem to be more plausible than non‐flexible ones. Yet, together with sufficient‐for‐existence properties, they imply flexible individual essences. How plausible are these? Should we revise our intuitions supporting flexible essential properties? • What are, ultimately, the ontological differences between a necessitist approach to possibilia and an individual‐essences‐based approach? • According to necessitism, essential properties do not impose necessary conditions for an object’s existence. Can the necessitist, nonetheless, capture this role of essential properties by saying that, when it comes to possibly concrete entities, essential properties provide necessary conditions for an object’s concreteness? Can they, on a similar vein, also offer sufficient‐for‐concreteness properties as a surrogate for the (non‐necessitist’s) sufficient‐for‐existence properties? • Even after the enormous amount of literature that essentialism has generated, we are far from reaching a general agreement as to which properties are essential and which are accidental. Should this be a reason to reflect, critically, on the methodology that is being used in the arguments for or against essential properties? Is reliance on intuitions inescapable? (shrink)

Autonomy, we suppose, is self-regulation or self-direction. There is a distinct idea that is easily confused with self-direction, namely, self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Although it will turn out paradoxically that autonomy is neither self-regulation nor self-realization, it is reasonable to suppose that the former is a superior candidate. My teacher of Indian religion, Dr. Subodh Roy, blind from birth, chose not to undergo an operation that would have made him sighted because he believed, perhaps rightly, that the ability to see (...) would interfere with his religious quest. He thereby chose not to realize one of his fundamental human capacities, one whose cultivation has produced some of the finest fruits of civilization. Joseph Raz describes a case in which a man places his life in jeopardy by undertaking a trip to deliver medical aid to a group of people in a distant place. Since he will be unable to secure food for several days, he, in effect, subordinates one of his own basic needs or interests to a goal that he deems more important. There is no reason to believe that, in refusing to express or realize a dimension of self, either Dr. Roy or Raz's philanthropist have failed to act autonomously. (shrink)

This text presents a few preliminary results of research currently being conducted at the Université de Sherbrooke’s Research Institute on Educational Practices. The study seeks to understand how situations presented in teacher education can support the functioning and success of trainee teachers’ professional learning. The article’s aim is to identify the points of convergence between situations of professional activity, situations of professional learning, and training situations. The text will attempt to analyze the role that can be played by certain training (...) structures that seek to support a professionalization process that we define in terms of a general aim: the construction of professional knowledge. The originality of this research lies in that it draws on the work of Gaston Bachelard to develop a theoretical frame enabling a reading and interpretation of the results. Ce texte présente quelques résultats préliminaires d’une recherche menée présentement à l’Institut de recherche sur les pratiques éducatives de l’Université de Sherbrooke. Cette recherche vise à comprendre comment les situations présentes dans la formation à l’enseignement peuvent soutenir le fonctionnement et la réussite de l’apprentissage professionnel des enseignants en formation. Nous cherchons à identifier les points de rencontre entre les situations d’activité professionnelle, les situations d’apprentissage professionnel et les situations de formation. Nous tenterons d’analyser le rôle que peuvent jouer certains dispositifs visant à soutenir un processus de professionnalisation que nous définissons au regard d’une finalité : la construction de savoirs professionnels. L’originalité de cette recherche est la convocation des travaux de Gaston Bachelard pour élaborer le cadre théorique permettant la lecture et l’interprétation des résultats. (shrink)

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and ...

Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. (...) Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Cogitations: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Language and a Study of It in Relation to the Cogito. (shrink)

This article explores the motives underlying corporate responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis begins with Thomas Dunfee’s Statement of Minimum Moral Obligation (SMMO), which specifies, more precisely than any other contribution to the business ethics canon, the level of corporate beneficence required during a pandemic. The analysis then turns to Milton Friedman’s neoliberal understanding of human nature, critically contrasting it with the notion of stoic virtue that informs the works of Adam Smith. Friedman contends that beneficence should play no (...) role in corporate settings. Smith, by contrast, emphasizes the need for prudence, beneficence and self-command in all human endeavours. The article then uses these competing frameworks to reflect on a published survey of 145 corporate responses to COVID-19. In many of these responses, the benefit to a non-financial stakeholder is clear, while the financial consequence to the firm remains nebulous. This supports the contention that during a pandemic, beneficence provides a more complete explanation of many corporate actions than the profit motive alone. The article contests Friedman’s Chicago School profit imperative and goes beyond Dunfee’s SMMO by endorsing the more full-throated embrace of beneficence and stoic virtue found in the works of Smith. (shrink)

Gaston Fessard employs Hegel’s dialectical logic to clarify how St. Ignatius’s _Spiritual Exercises_ envisage and prepare the decisions and choices between contrasting options or major turning points in spiritual life, in moments of what Ignatius would call _Election_.

We are in a time of rapid change on multiple levels. Change can be seen as positive by one group and negative by another. As a result, different perspectives on any given change can draw completely different conclusions. In these proceedings we want to address different approaches to change from all kinds of perspectives within the realm of citizen science and participatory research. We discuss both active, transformative change, and the observation of change monitored by citizen science in all kinds (...) of disciplines. We highlight the potential of citizen science to be a change maker in research and society, and as a tool to manage the change happening around us. The proceedings "Change - The transformative power of citizen science" showcase a selection of topics that have been presented and discussed at the ECSA/ACSC 2024 double conference in Vienna and highlight the transformative power, citizen science can have. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo aborda uno de los modos de localización de entidades en situaciones espaciales estáticas: la deíxis espacial. Nuestro objetivo principal es describir la estructura y uso del sistema demostrativo en espacio de escala menor en la lengua hablada por los gitanos de Chile: el rromané jorajané. Para la obtención de los datos se utilizó The 1999 Demonstrative Questionnaire: ‘THIS’ and ‘THAT’ in comparative perspective. Los resultados del análisis destacan que los demostrativos espaciales del rromané jorajané constituyen un grupo (...) altamente simétrico, que combina un componente semántico deíctico, junto con contenidos gramaticales. Se trata de un sistema demostrativo binario en cuanto a la categoría de distancia respecto del centro deíctico. Se concluye también que la selección del demostrativo apropiado obedece al siguiente patrón: el demostrativo proximal tiene su área focal en la zona próxima al hablante, mientras que el demostrativo distal incluye en su campo de aplicación tanto la zona próxima al oyente como la zona distante al hablante.: This paper addresses one way of locating entities in static spatial situations: the spatial deixis. Our main purpose is to describe the structure and use of the demonstrative system in small-scale space in the language spoken by Gypsies in Chile: the rromané jorajané. Data collection was performed with “The 1999 Demonstrative Questionnaire: ‘THIS’ and ‘THAT’ in comparative perspective”. The analysis results highlight that spatial demonstratives in rromané jorajané are a highly symmetrical group combining a deictic semantic component with grammatical contents. It is a binary demonstrative system in terms of the category of distance from the deictic center. Additionally, it is concluded that choice of the suitable demonstrative proceeds according to the following pattern: the proximal demonstrative has its focal area in the speaker’s zone of proximity, while the distal demonstrative includes both the addressee’s zone of proximity and the speaker’s distal zone within its application field. (shrink)

In this important new book, Jacques Derrida talks with Bernard Stiegler about the effect of teletechnologies on our philosophical and political moment. Improvising before a camera, the two philosophers are confronted by the very technologies they discuss and so are forced to address all the more directly the urgent questions that they raise. What does it mean to speak of the present in a situation of "live" recording? How can we respond, responsibly, to a question when we know that (...) the so-called "natural" conditions of expression, discussion, reflection, and deliberation have been breached? As Derrida and Stiegler discuss the role of teletechnologies in modern society, the political implications of Derrida's thought become apparent. Drawing on recent events in Europe, Derrida and Stiegler explore the impact of television and the internet on our understanding of the state, its borders and citizenship. Their discussion examines the relationship between the juridical and the technical, and it shows how new technologies for manipulating and transmitting images have influenced our notions of democracy, history and the body. The book opens with a shorter interview with Derrida on the news media, and closes with a provocative essay by Stiegler on the epistemology of digital photography. In Echographies of Television, Derrida and Stiegler open up questions that are of key social and political importance. Their book will be of great interest to all those already familiar with Derrida's work, as well as to students and scholars of philosophy, literature, sociology and media studies. (shrink)

Much has been published on the career and scholarly achievements of Bernard Smith (1916–2011) since his retirement from teaching in 1977 and has predictably gathered pace after his death. It is clear that the reception of his very substantial body of writings, addressing so many fields within the humanities, critical thought and art history in particular, is only just beginning. The present study focuses on a large recent collection of Smith’s studies in which critical responses are integrated. I argue (...) that the profoundly personal nature of historiography, necessarily incorporating praise and blame in its rhetorical structure, requires that the critic position oneself openly in relation to the life and work of the subject undergoing scrutiny. Smith’s antipodean experience was in many ways distinctive. But those of us who knew him personally, or felt his influence as a teacher and writer, will need to reassess honestly their own genesis in order to deal effectively with the challenges embedded in his work. (shrink)

The justification of Bayes' rule by cognitive rationality principles is undertaken by extending the propositional axiom systems usually proposed in two contexts of belief change: revising and updating. Probabilistic belief change axioms are introduced, either by direct transcription of the set-theoretic ones, or in a stronger way but nevertheless in the spirit of the underlying propositional principles. Weak revising axioms are shown to be satisfied by a General Conditioning rule, extending Bayes' rule but also compatible with others, and weak updating (...) axioms by a General Imaging rule, extending Lewis' rule. Strong axioms (equivalent to the Miller–Popper axiom system) are necessary to justify Bayes' rule in a revising context, and justify in fact an extended Bayes' rule which applies, even if the message has zero probability. (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan was a Canadian Jesuit philosopher, theologian, and humanist who taught in Montreal, Toronto, Rome, and Boston. His groundbreaking works Insight: A Study of Human Understanding and Method in Theology attempt to discern how knowledge is advanced in the natural sciences, the human studies, the arts, ethics, and theology. In Engaging the Thought of Bernard Lonergan, Louis Roy stresses the empirical aspect of Lonergan’s cognitional theory in relation to the role of meaning, objectivity, subjectivity, and historical consciousness. (...) Rather than introducing every facet of his philosophy and theology, Roy delivers a balanced account of Lonergan’s achievements in fifteen discrete studies, delving into the implications of his cognitional theory for religious experience, theology, education, truth, classicism, relativism, and ethics. Discussing aspects of Lonergan’s thought that are seldom examined, these fifteen studies represent, criticize, and develop the ideas of one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. Demonstrating the richness of one scholar’s contributions to contemporary culture, Engaging the Thought of Bernard Lonergan presents a thoughtful analysis and a significant advance in Lonergan studies. (shrink)

The instant -- The problem of habit and discontinuous time -- The idea of progress and the intuition of discontinuous time -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: "Poetic instant and metaphysical instant" by Gaston Bachelard -- Appendix B: Reading Bachelard reading Siloe: an excerpt from "Introduction to Bachelard's poetics" by Jean Lescure -- Appendix C: A short biography of Gaston Bachelard.

Following on from Roy Bhaskarâe(tm)s first two books, A Realist Theory of Science and The Possibility of Naturalism, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, establishes the conception of social science as explanatoryâe"and thence emancipatoryâe"critique. Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation starts from an assessment of the impasse of contemporary accounts of science as stemming from an incomplete critique of positivism. It then proceeds to a systematic exposition of scientific realism in the form of transcendental realism, highlighting a conception of science as explanatory (...) of a structured, differentiated and changing world. Turning to the social domain, the book argues for a view of the social order as conditioned by, and emergent from, nature. Advocating a critical naturalism, the author shows how the transformational model of social activity together with the conception of social science as explanatory critique which it entails, resolves the divisions and dualisms besetting orthodox social and normative theory: between society and the individual, structure and agency, meaning and behavior, mind and body, reason and cause, fact and value, and theory and practice. The book then goes on to discuss the emancipatory implications of social science and sketches the nature of the depth investigation characteristically entailed. In the highly innovative third part of the book Roy Bhaskar completes his critique of positivism by developing a theory of philosophical discourse and ideology, on the basis of the transcendental realism and critical naturalism already developed, showing how positivism functions as a restrictive ideology of and for science and other social practices. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Informed Consent in Medical Therapy and Research. By Bernard Barber.

To answer the question in the title, we take as an example the model for the regulation of agonistic antagonistic couples (MRAAC). It is a model that associates 4 non-linear differential equations and allows to simulate balance, imbalance between two state variables, and control, if necessary, by two control variables of the same nature as the state variables: this control is defined as a bilateral strategy (bipolar therapy in the medical field). The super model for the regulation of agonism antagonistic (...) couples (SMRAAC), that may be also considered as an agonistic antagonistic network (AAN), associates several elementary MRAAC's, but the interconnection structure falls equally under the category of the agonistic antagonism (AA). First we indicate what may be the results of the interconnection, favourable or not. In the last case, a control can be performed, by acting upon a sole couple of the SMRAAC, even if other couples were imbalanced (with two AA control variables only). Simulation examples are given. We bring also a new result with the SMRAAC, i.e. the appearance of strange auractors with this model. The general models belonging to the AA phylum should put on a growing importance in the future, because they could be the sole models enable to control some complex systems by avoiding the perverse effects of the unilateral strategies. (shrink)

With this significant work from 1932, The Self-Conscious Determination of Nothingness, we have the third important book of Nishida’s period of philosophical maturity. Here, Nishida has moved beyond the unconvincing essays of the previous periods, such as the ingenuous psychologism of A Study of Good or the epistemological theorization of the hesitant neo-Kantian period. Nishida is now developing the consequences of his major philosophical notion, the “logic of place”. Thanks to the translation work of Jacynthe Tremblay, the whole production of (...) this decisive period is now... (shrink)

This collection of essays, addresses, and one interview come from the years 1966-73 and cover a wide spectrum of interest, dealing with such general topics as 'The Absence of God in Modern Culture' and 'The Future of Christianity.'.

_Dialectic_ is now widely regarded as a classic of contemporary philosophy. This book, first published in 1993, sets itself three main aims: the development of a general theory of dialectic, of which Hegelian dialectic can be seen to be a special case; the dialectical enrichment and deepening of critical realism, viz. into the system of dialectical critical realism; and the outline of the elements of a totalizing critique of Western philosophy. The first chapter clarifies the rational core of Hegelian dialectic. (...) Chapter two then proceeds to develop a general theory of dialectic. Isolating the fallacy of 'ontological monovalence', Roy Bhaskar then shows how absence and other negating concepts such as contradiction have a legitimate and necessary ontological employment. He then goes on to give a synoptic account of key dialectical concepts such as the concrete universal; to sketch the further dialectical development of critical naturalism through an account of what he calls four-planar social being; and following consideration of the dialectical critique of analytical reason, he moves on to the real definition of dialectic as absenting absence and in the human sphere, the axiology of freedom. Chapter three extends and deepens critical realism’s characteristic concerns with ontology, science, social science and emancipation not only into the realms of negativity and totality, but also into the fields of reference and truth, spatio-temporality, tense and process, the logic of dialectical universalizability and on to the plane of ethics, where it articulates a combination of moral realism and ethical naturalism, whereby consideration of elemental desire involves commitment to the eudaimonistic society. This is then followed by a sublime discussion of key moments in the trajectory of Western philosophy, the tradition of which can now be seen to be based on what the author calls the unholy trinity of the epistemic fallacy or the reduction of being to knowledge, primal squeeze or the collapse of structure and alethic truth, and ontological monovalence. (shrink)

In his monumental 1687 work, _Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica_, known familiarly as the _Principia_, Isaac Newton laid out in mathematical terms the principles of time, force, and motion that have guided the development of modern physical science. Even after more than three centuries and the revolutions of Einsteinian relativity and quantum mechanics, Newtonian physics continues to account for many of the phenomena of the observed world, and Newtonian celestial dynamics is used to determine the orbits of our space vehicles. This (...) authoritative, modern translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, the first in more than 285 years, is based on the 1726 edition, the final revised version approved by Newton; it includes extracts from the earlier editions, corrects errors found in earlier versions, and replaces archaic English with contemporary prose and up-to-date mathematical forms. Newton's principles describe acceleration, deceleration, and inertial movement; fluid dynamics; and the motions of the earth, moon, planets, and comets. A great work in itself, the _Principia_ also revolutionized the methods of scientific investigation. It set forth the fundamental three laws of motion and the law of universal gravity, the physical principles that account for the Copernican system of the world as emended by Kepler, thus effectively ending controversy concerning the Copernican planetary system. The illuminating Guide to Newton's _Principia_ by I. Bernard Cohen makes this preeminent work truly accessible for today's scientists, scholars, and students. (shrink)

I examine recent work on moral dilemmas and argue that there are no moral dilemmas which issue in inescapable wrongdoing . In the first three chapters I examine some important arguments for and against tragic dilemmas---arguments from deontic logic, Martha Nussbaum's view that vulnerability is essential to human values, Bernard Williams' argument from guilt , and the argument from the fragmentation of value---and show that these arguments for and against are inconclusive. ;In Chapter 4 I attempt to provide a (...) reason to reject tragic dilemmas which will have force for those most inclined to accept dilemmas---those, such as Williams and Nussbaum, who are engaged in a critique of modern moral philosophy. Central to their critique is their denial of the distinction between moral and nonmoral reasons and of the primacy of the moral. I show that an account of practical deliberation which can accommodate the possibility of tragic dilemmas has the effect, not of undermining the distinction between moral and nonmoral reasons and the primacy of the moral, but of strengthening that distinction and that primacy. This is because a picture of practical deliberation which can accommodate the possibility of tragic dilemmas makes moral reasons distinct from nonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight. ;In Chapter 5 I present an alternative picture of practical deliberation which I commend to these critics. In my alternative picture, moral reasons have deliberative weight for an agent for the same reason nonmoral reasons do: because the agent sees things from a point of view from which such reasons are important. My picture takes seriously the critics' view that moral value is continuous with other sorts of value and is not overriding and supremely regulative; but my picture does not accommodate the possibility of tragic dilemmas. I conclude that their project of criticizing modern moral philosophy is better served by accepting my picture and thus rejecting the possibility of tragic dilemmas. (shrink)